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THE GISSEL BARGAINING ORDER, THE
NLRB, AND THE COURTS OF APPEALS:
SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT TAKE
A SECOND LOOK?
In 1947, Congress declared the labor policy of the United
States to be the elimination of "the causes of certain substantial
obstructions to the free flow of commerce by encouraging
the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by pro-
tecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing .... ." The usual procedure by which employees des-
ignate their choice of a representative for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining is an election conducted by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB).2 Not only is this the usual procedure,
it is "from the Board's point of view, the preferred route"'3 be-
cause it is an election supervised by a Board agent in which eli-
gible employees may vote by a secret ballot. If the NLRB deter-
mines that, prior to an election, the employer engaged in
conduct that created an atmosphere of fear or confusion, the
Board may decide that a fair and free election is not possible. In
such a case, the NLRB may issue a bargaining order, ordering
the employer to recognize the affected representative (usually a
union) and to engage in collective bargaining. In this way, the
union, which was not selected by the employees as their exclu-
sive representative in a secret ballot election, secures, through
another avenue, the right to bargain for them.
1. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
2. The procedures for obtaining an election are found in 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
3. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 596 (1969)(citing Aaron Bros., 158
N.L.R.B. 1077 (1966)).
4. See generally NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n.16 (1962).
5. Procedurally, to obtain a bargaining order when an election has been held and the
union has lost, the union must have the election set aside in a representation proceeding
by filing objections to the election within five working days after the service of the tally
of ballots. The union must then initiate an unfair labor practice proceeding. Irving Air
Chute, 149 N.L.R.B. 627 (1964), enforced, 350 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1965).
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I. THE BARGAINING ORDER IN THE SUPREME COURT
The remedy of the bargaining order was reviewed by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,6 a consolidation
of four cases-three from the Fourth Circuit7 and one from the
First Circuit.8 In each case, the organizers of a union campaign
had solicited a majority of employees to sign cards that unam-
biguously authorized the union to represent them in collective
bargaining. The NLRB found that the employers had violated
sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the Labor Management Relations
Act9 by engaging in coercive activities and by wrongfully dis-
charging employees, and section 8(a)(5)10 by rejecting the repre-
sentative's bargaining demand. In each case, the Board issued a
bargaining order.
Although the Foutth Circuit sustained the Board's findings
of violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (3), it refused to enforce the
bargaining orders because "authorization cards are such unrelia-
ble indicators of the desires of the employees that an employer
confronted with a demand for recognition based solely upon
them is justified in withholding recognition pending the result of
6. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
7. General Steel Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336 (4th
Cir. 1968).
8. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1970). As provided therein, it is an unfair labor prac-
tice for an employer
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ....
Id.
Section 157 defines the rights of employees, commonly referred to as section 7 rights:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right
to refrain from any or all of such activities ....
Id. § 157.
10. Id. § 158(a)(5). This section provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for
an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees
.. ." Id.
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a certification election."'
On similar facts, the First Circuit sustained the Board's
findings and enforced the bargaining order in full because the
company had made no attempt to establish any facts to show a
good-faith doubt of the union's majority status.12 To resolve the
conflict between the circuits on the issue of authorization cards
and their effect on the obligation to bargain, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
First, the Court adopted the doctrine developed by the
Board in Cumberland Shoe Corp.:13 cards that unambiguously
authorize the union to represent the employees for collective
bargaining purposes validly indicate the employee sentiment,
unless the employees are "expressly told that their act of signing
represents something else, ' 14 for example, that the cards will be
used only to obtain an election. Thus, authorization cards,
"though admittedly inferior to the election process, can ade-
quately reflect employee sentiment when that process has been
impeded" by certain unfair labor practices of the employer.1 5
The Court then described three categories of unfair labor
practices subject to the remedial powers of the NLRB. Two cat-
egories were found to impede the election process sufficiently to
require a bargaining order. In the first category of" 'exceptional'
cases marked by 'outrageous' and 'pervasive' unfair labor prac-
tices," a bargaining order was held to be appropriate even with-
out proof that the union ever had majority status.16 With this
holding, the Court merely approved the Fourth Circuit's view
that in "extraordinary cases. . . a bargaining order might be an
appropriate remedy for pervasive violation of § 8(a)(1).M7
The Court, however, did not limit the use of bargaining or-
ders to the exceptional cases. It also approved them in a second
category of "less extraordinary cases marked by less pervasive
practices which nonetheless still have the tendency to under-
11. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 398 F.2d 336, 337 (4th Cir. 1968).
12. See NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157, 161 (1st Cir. 1968).
13. 144 N.L.R.B. 1268 (1963).
14. 395 U.S. at 607.
15. Id. at 603.
16. Id. at 613.
17. NLRB v. Heck's, Inc., 398 F.2d 337, 339 (4th Cir. 1968); see NLRB v. Logan
Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 570 (4th Cir. 1967).
19801
3
Sabalis: The Gissel Bargaining Order, the NLRB, and the Courts of Appeals:
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32
mine majority strength and impede the election processes."18
The Court required "a showing that at one point the union had
a majority," 9 although the union did not have to show that it
was able to maintain the majority status.2" Further, the Board
was required to find prior to issuing a bargaining order that "the
possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring
a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional reme-
dies, though present, is slight and the employee sentiment once
expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected
by a bargaining order ... ."21 A third category of "minor or less
extensive unfair labor practices" would not sustain a bargaining
order "because of their minimal impact on the election
machinery.
'22
The goal or purpose of a bargaining order in the second cat-.
egory of unfair labor practices is twofold. The Court in Gissel
described the goals as "effectuating ascertainable employee free
choice" and "deterring employer misbehavior, "23 and recognized
that both are equally important. Emphasizing one goal or pur-
18. 395 U.S. at 614.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 610 (citing NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n.16 (1962)).
21. 395 U.S. at 614. Traditional remedies of the NLRB include the following.
the issuance of a comprehensive cease-and-desist order; ordering Respondent
to post notices in conspicuous places at its plant for 60 consecutive days;... ;
ordering Respondent to give the Union access to employees at the plant during
working hours;. . . ; seeking an injunction against Respondent in Federal dis-
trict court ... ; and ordering the Regional Director ... to conduct a rerun
election at Respondent's plant.
Rapid Mfg. Co., 239 N.L.R.B. 465, 468 n.18 (1978). The value of a cease and desist order
is twofold. "First, the order will provide added protection against the likelihood of the
recurrence of the misconduct, and second, the posting of the order finding the company
guilty of unfair labor practices will almost certainly have a favorable impact on the
Union's chances for success in the election." NLRB v. Appletree Chevrolet, Inc., 608
F.2d 988, 996 n.13 (4th Cir. 1979)(citing Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d
1108, 1121 (7th Cir. 1973)).
22. 395 U.S. at 615.
23. Id. at 614. Free choice has been described by one commentator as one made free
of any physical intimidation and
free from restrictions that obstruct the flow of relevant information and free
from influences that will distort their assessment of the consequences of union-
ization-from inaccurate representation of material facts, threats of retribution
which cannot be carried out . . . . Employees should also be allowed to ap-
praise the consequences of representation in the light of their own preferences
and aspirations, however misguided these may appear to the Board.
Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, 78 HARv. L. REv. 38, 46-47 (1964).
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pose over the other would alter the analysis required to deter-
mine whether a bargaining order is an appropriate remedy. The
circuit courts have developed different standards of review of
Gissel-type bargaining orders; the standard selected relates to
the court's perception of the purpose of the order.24
IL THE BARGAINING ORDER IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS-THE
EXTENT OF ANALYSIS REQUIRED
2 5
In the months immediately following the Gissel decision,
the circuit courts generally did not deny enforcement of a Gis-
sel-type, or second category, bargaining order. Appeals either
were affirmed with little discussion26 or remanded to the Board
24. In the District of Columbia Circuit, the bargaining order is a "remedy for an
unlawful refusal to bargain." Retail Store Employees Local 88 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 329,
336 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In the Second Circuit, it is a remedy "to deprive the employer of
the fruits of his illegal activity. . . ." NLRB v. Marsellus Vault & Sales, Inc., 61 Lab.
Cas. 10,382, at 17,348 (1969), afl'd on add'l findings, 431 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1970)(A
unamimous panel affirmed the earlier majority decision after receiving additional evi-
dence from the NLRB. The evidence showed that the authorization cards were not am-
biguous, as originally determined, and were evidence that the union had majority sta-
tus.). The bargaining order in the Ninth Circuit avoids the added inducement to the
employer to indulge in unfair practices in order to defeat the union in an election. NLRB
v. L.B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1969). The Seventh Circuit also ruled that the
remedy for serious unfair labor practices is "an order which will effectively discourage
their repetition" regardless of the actual impact on the election. NLRB v. Drives, Inc.,
440 F.2d 354, 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912 (1971).
Conversely, the Fifth Circuit focuses on safeguarding employee free choice, finding
that a bargaining order based on a card majority is an "extraordinary remedy ... to
overcome the polluting effects of the employer's unfair labor practices on the electoral
atmosphere. The order is not a traditional punitive remedy, but is a therapeutic one."
NLRB v. American Cable Syss., Inc., 427 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
957 (1970).
25. The Administrative Procedure Act requires that the decisions of administrative
agencies include "findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the
material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record; .... " 5 U.S.C. §
557(c)(3)(A) (1976).
26. NLRB v. Arrow Specialties, Inc., 437 F.2d 522 (8th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Gerbes
Super Mkts., Inc., 436 F.2d 19 (8th Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Easton Packing Co., 437 F.2d
811 (3d Cir. 1971); Texaco, Inc. v. NLRB, 436 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1971); Southwest Re-
gional Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 1027 (D.C. Cir.
1970); NLRB v. Ayer Lar Sanitarium, 436 F.2d 45 (9th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Int'l Metal
Specialties, Inc., 433 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1970); NLRB v. V & H Indus., Inc., 433 F.2d 9 (2d
Cir. 1970); Snyder Tank Corp. v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 1348 (2d Cir. 1970); Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom.
McEwen Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 988 (1970); NLRB v. Staub Cleaners, Inc., 418 F.2d
1086 (2d Cir. 1969); NLRB v. L.B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Cedar
Hills Theaters, Inc., 417 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Wylie Mfg. Co., 417 F.2d 192
5
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for further consideration in light of Gissel.2 7 The affirming
courts deferred to the Board's expertise in labor matters" and
"entrust[ed] to the Board almost total discretion to determine
when a bargaining order is appropriate.
'29
Such deference was shortlived in the Fifth Circuit. In NLRB
v. American Cable Systems, Inc.,30 the court required the Board
to justify the issuance of a bargaining order by specific findings
that
(a) the union had valid authorization cards from a majority of
the employees in an appropriate bargaining unit; (b) the em-
ployer's unfair labor practices, although not "outrageous" and
"pervasive" enough to justify a bargaining order in the absence
of a card majority, were still serious and extensive; (c) "the
possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensur-
ing a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional
remedies, though present, is slight;" and (d) employee senti-
ment can best be protected in the particular case by a bargain-
ing order.31
The emphasis is on effectuating employee free choice through a
bargaining order, not on deterring employer misbehavior. The
test of American Cable continues to be the standard in the Fifth
Circuit32 and has provided a model for other courts.
Eighteen months after Gissel, in NLRB v. General Stencils,
Inc.,3 3 the Second Circuit directed the Board to develop rules
(10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. S.E. Nichols-Dover, Inc., 414 F.2d 561 (3d Cir. 1969); NLRB
v. South Bay Daily Breeze, 415 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1969); Amalgamated Clothing Workers
v. NLRB, 420 F.2d 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
27. See NLRB v. Pembek Oil Corp., 433 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Produc-
tion Indus., Inc., 425 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Li'l Gen. Stores, Inc., 422 F.2d
571 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Henry Colder Co., 416 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1969); NLRB v.
Easton Packing Co., 416 F.2d 256 (3d Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Mink-Dayton, Inc., 416 F.2d
327 (6th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. American Art Indus., Inc., 415 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1969);
Mechanical Specialties Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Ameri-
can Cable Syss., Inc., 414 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1969).
28. For the Supreme Court's acknowledgment of this expertise in Gissel, see 395
U.S. at 612 n.32.
29. NLRB v. Int'l Metal Specialties, Inc., 433 F.2d 870, 872 (2d Cir. 1970).
30. 414 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1969).
31. Id. at 668.
32. NLRB v. Gibson Paper Prod. Co., 494 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1974)("[T]he ulti-
mate inquiry is whether a fair election can be held;. Id. at 768); NLRB v. WKRG-
TV, Inc., 470 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1973).
33. 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971).
404 [Vol. 32
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which "would reveal at least some of the Board's thought
processes to unions, employers, and reviewing courts, and would
bring about a degree of certainty and uniformity . . . ."I Ab-
sent such rules, the Board should explain in each case "what it
considers to have precluded a fair election and why, and in what
respects the case differs from others where it has reached an op-
posite conclusion. '35 The court emphasized that similar cases
should receive similar treatment and that the Board is responsi-
ble to explain why- it imposes a remedy in one case and not
another."6
The Second Circuit, as well as the Fifth Circuit, focuses now
on the possibility of a fair election, and not, as it had empha-
sized in an earlier case,37 on the deterrence of employer misbe-
havior. To justify a bargaining. order, the Board must "attempt
to integrate findings of company misconduct with a reasoned
analysis of how that misconduct jeopardized the chances for a
fair election. 38 In General Stencils, the Board failed to meet
the standard on remand, and on a second appeal to the Second
Circuit, the court denied enforcement of the order.3 9
In a series of cases, the Seventh Circuit articulated its re-
quirement-a detailed analysis of the causal connection between
the unfair labor practices and the unlikelihood of a fair elec-
tion.40 The Board must evaluate the continuing impact of the
misconduct, the likelihood that it will recur, and the potential
effectiveness of traditional remedies.4 1 The Board can consider
any history of employer antiunion animus and violations of the
Labor Management Relations Act, or any affirmative acts by the
employer that indicate a spirit of cooperation that could assure a
fair election.42 Consideration of these factors is consistent with
34. Id. at 901.
35. Id. at 902.
36. Id. at 904-05. See NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 602 F.2d 1100 (2d Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. M.H. Brown Co., 441 F.2d 839, 843 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971).
37. NLRB v. Marsellus Vault & Sales, Inc., 61 Lab. Cas. 10,382 (2d Cir. 1969).
38. NLRB v. World Carpets Inc., 463 F.2d 57, 62 n.6 (2d Cir. 1972).
39. See NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 472 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1972).
40. E.g., New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 491 (7th Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1971).
41. Self-Reliance Ukrainian Am. Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 33, 39 (7th Cir.
1972).
42. Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973). See note 122
infra.
1980]
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the circuit's earlier emphasis on the bargaining order as a rem-
edy to discourage the repetition of serious unfair labor prac-
tices.43 In Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 44 the Seventh Circuit summa-
rized the criteria necessary to support a Gissel-type bargaining
order:
(1) Did the Union have majority support in an appropriate
unit prior to the impact of Company unfair practices?
(2) Did Company unfair practices cause the Union to lose its
majority?
(3) Will lesser remedies be insufficient to overcome the im-
pact of past unfair practices or to deter similar future conduct,
so that a fair election could not be held within a reasonable
time?45
The second criterion, that the unfair practices cause the union
to lose its majority, is not entirely consistent with the Gissel lan-
guage that approved the bargaining order in those cases in which
the unfair practices "have the tendency to undermine majority
strength and impede the election process. 4 Actual loss of ma-
jority status was not required. If the Board failed to make the
required findings, the courts of this circuit have made the
detailed findings in recent cases, rather than prolong the pro-
ceedings by remanding to the Board.47 The specific findings re-
quired by the Seventh Circuit in Walgreen are also required by
the Tenth Circuit" and the Sixth Circuit.49
The Eighth Circuit declines to make these detailed findings
and will enforce a bargaining order if the evidence in the record
establishes that the violations did undermine the union major-
43. NLRB v. Drives, Inc., 440 F.2d at 366.
44. 509 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1975).
45. Id. at 1017 n.2. The need for a detailed analysis is heightened when a bargaining
order is issued solely on the basis of § 8(a)(1) violations. First Lakewood Assocs. v.
NLRB, 582 F.2d 416, 424 (7th Cir. 1978).
46. 395 U.S. at 614 (emphasis added).
47. First Lakewood Assocs. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 416 (7th Cir. 1978)(bargaining order
denied: "a new election will more effectively promote the policy of employee free choice."
Id. at 424.); C & W Super Mkts., Inc. v. NLRB, 581 F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1978)(bargaining
order enforced).
48. See NLRB v. Miller Trucking Serv., Inc., 445 F.2d 927 (10th Cir. 1971).
49. See NLRB v. Essex Wire Corp., 496 F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1972)(mem.). The court
critically referred to the Board's reasoning as "'a litany, reciting conclusions by note
without factual explication."' Id. at 863 (quoting NLRB v. American Cable Syss., Inc.,
427 F.2d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 1970)).
[Vol. 32
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss2/7
Gissel BARGAINING ORDER
ity.50 In Arbie Mineral Feed Co. v. NLRB,51 the court denied
enforcement because the evidence affirmatively indicated "that
the unfair practices did not tend to undermine a union majority;
in fact, the unfair practices preceded the union's most successful
card signing period. '5 2 But in an extraordinary invitation to the
Board not to make any analysis relating to the impact of unfair
labor practices, the court held that if "the record is silent con-
cerning the actual impact of the employer's unfair practices, we
defer to the Board's exercise of discretion and grant enforce-
ment . . . "5 This is an unique standard among the circuits
and is still law in the Eighth Circuit,54 although there has been
dissent.
55
The District of Columbia Circuit, as well as the Eighth Cir-
cuit, defers to the expertise of the Board, noting that Gissel
"does not require a finding that no other remedy could suffice,
only that the bargaining order better protects employees' ex-
pressed union preference.
'58
In 1976, the Third Circuit, following the majority of circuits,
ruled in NLRB v. Armcor Industries, Inc.57 that the Board must
set forth a reasoned analysis to justify the remedy of a bargain-
ing order. This analysis is necessary to "'guarantee the integrity
of the administrative process,' "158 to contribute to the growth
and predictability of this area of labor law, and to serve "as a
prophylaxis against an arbitrary exercise of the Board's
50. See Drug Package, Inc. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1978)(citing Arbie
Mineral Feed Co. v. NLRB, 438 F.2d 940, 945 (8th Cir. 1971)).
51. Arbie Mineral Feed Co. v. NLRB, 438 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1971).
52. Id. at 944.
53. Id. at 945.
54. See Drug Package, Inc. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 1340, 1344-45 (8th Cir. 1978)("[T]he
record is largely silent on the actual impact of the Company's unfair labor practices upon
the employees' support for the Union." Id. at 1344. Following the holding in Arbie Min-
eral Feed, the court granted enforcement.).
55. See Tipton Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 621 F.2d 890 (8th Cir. 1980)(Gibson, C.J., dis-
senting). The Chief Judge, who did not participate in Arbie Mineral Feed or Drug Pack-
age, observed that the Board's finding that unfair labor practices were committed "rests
upon tenuous evidence" and that "accepting that determination as the basis for a bar-
gaining order perverts the duty of the Board and this court to protect employee free
choice." Id. at 900.
56. Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 527 F.2d 803, 807 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
57. 535 F.2d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 1976).
58. Id. at 245 (quoting Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade,
412 U.S. 800, 807 (1973)).
1980]
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power." 19 The court enforced this requirement in subsequent
cases e and added that the Board must provide its own analysis,
not merely adopt the findings of the administrative law judge.6 1
"The rationale undergirding the Armcor ruling is that because
these coercive effects must exist in order for the bargaining or-
der to be an appropriate remedy, the Board should be required
to explain with specificity the results of the unfair practices and,
in particular, the unlikelihood of a fair election. ' 62 By requiring
the Board to provide its own analysis, the court hoped to guar-
antee that the evidence would be considered by the Board, not
just by the administrative law judge.8
The Third Circuit reconsidered this requirement" following
the Supreme Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,65
which the circuit court understood to express "the basic philoso-
phy that agencies should be relatively free to establish their own
procedures and mechanisms for decision-making on subjects
within the scope of their expertise." 66 The Third Circuit, there-
fore, no longer requires a separate Board opinion as long as the
Board specifically adopts the findings of an administrative law
judge who had fully set forth his reasoning.8 7
The Third Circuit, however, does ndt automatically defer to
the Board's evidentiary findings. In Rapid Manufacturing Co., 8
the Board first determined that the unfair labor practices "un-
dermined the majority strength of the Union, eroded the labora-
tory conditions necessary for the effectuation of a fair and mean-
ingful election, and effectively thwarted the proper functioning
of the Board's election processes."69 Second, the Board deter-
mined whether alternative remedial measures would not be
likely to erase the harmful effects of the unfair labor practices
59. 535 F.2d at 245 (citing Walgreen Co. v. NLRB, 509 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1975)).
60. See Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Eagle Mate-
rial Handling, Inc., 558 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977).
61. NLRB v. Craw, 565 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1977).
62. Id. at 1272.
63. See Kenworth Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 580 F.2d 55, 60 (3d Cir. 1978).
64. See id. at 61-63 (opinion on rehearing).
65. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
66. 580 F.2d at 62.
67. Id. at 62-63.
68. 239 N.L.R.B. 465 (1978).
69. Id. at 468.
[Vol. 32.
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and restore the laboratory conditions. Because both conditions
were met, a bargaining order was deemed appropriate. 70 The
Third Circuit challenged the Board's findings in the initial de-
termination concerning impact and refused enforcement of the
order.7 1 The thorough dissection of the Board's findings in
Rapid Manufacturing is contrary to previous holdings that the
court should defer to the Board's expertise in labor matters. 2
This inconsistency does not contribute to the growth and pre-
dictability of labor law, an articulated goal of the Third
Circuity.
The first mention of a required analysis in the First Circuit
occurred in 1978. If a case lacks "reasoning that we can evaluate,
we may feel obliged to remand to the Board for further proceed-
ings."' The analysis must consider the impact of the unfair la-
bor practices on election conditions and the potential for recur-
rence of the unfair labor practices and must "go beyond
semantics and give specific examples and precise reasons for this
extreme remedy.1
7 5
To justify "so stern a step as the imposition of the bargain-
ing order," the Fourth Circuit requires that a card majority had
existed at one time and that "conduct potentially impairing the
Union's majority" had occurred .7 The Third Circuit rule is fol-
lowed: there must be a detailed analysis in which the continuing
effect of misconduct and the potential effectiveness of tradi-
tional remedies are assessed in determining whether a fair elec-
tion could be held.
HI. CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING A BARGAINING ORDER
A. Unfair habor Practices
Underlying the requirement of a specific analysis by the
70. Id.
71. Rapid Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 1979). "We would be remiss
in our judicial functions if, on a record as sparse as this one, we were to enforce a bar-
gaining order... ." Id.
72. See notes 64-67 and accompanying text supra.
73. See NLRB v. Armcor Indus., Inc., 535 F.2d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 1976).
74. NLRB v. Matouk Indus., Inc., 582 F.2d 125, 130 (1st Cir. 1978).
75. NLRB v. Pilgrim Foods, Inc., 591 F.2d 110, 119 (1st Cir. 1978).
76. Schulman's Inc. v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 498, 501 (4th Cir. 1975)(citing Peerless of
America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973)).
77. NLRB v. Appletree Chevrolet, Inc., 608 F.2d 988, 997 (4th Cir. 1979).
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Board is an assumption that the Board has particular expertise
enabling it to determine the impact of employer conduct on the
employees' ability to make a free, uncoerced choice about un-
ions. Some commentators suggest that a specific determination
is not possible 8 and that "the most that can be asked for is a
reasoned explanation of the Board's conclusions, taking into ac-
count what is known about voting behavior. 79 A study by
Getman, Goldberg, and Herman"0 of the impact of certain em-
ployer conduct on the results of elections directly contradicts
some of the Board's assumptions that are significant in deter-
mining the need for a bargaining order.81
The Supreme Court in Gissel did not specify those unfair
labor practices it considered to have an impact on election con-
ditions. Only two were mentioned-threats by the employer to
close or transfer plant operations and threats to eliminate bene-
fits or refuse to deal with the union if elected. 2 The Court indi-
cated that threats to close the plant would likely have a signifi-
cant impact,8 3 citing a study that showed the union won only
twenty-nine percent of rerun elections in those situations.8
Threats to eliminate benefits were "less irremediable."8 5 This
study has been sharply criticized for its analytic methods, which
failed to consider other variables that might have influenced the
rerun elections.8 "
Getman and Goldberg indicate that the Board usually is-
sued a bargaining order when the unfair labor practice was
viewed as "deliberate" or "calculated" to interfere with em-
78. See Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CH. L.
REv. 681, 682 (1972); Bok, supra note 23.
79. Getman & Goldberg, supra note 78, at 698.
80. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS: LAw
AND REALITY (1976).
81. For example, concerning the assumption that employees are attentive to the
campaign and that the campaign changes votes, the authors' data indicate that employ-
ees have strong and stable predispositions and that the average employee remembers
only 10% of the issues presented by the company and only 7% of those presented by the
union. Id. at 72, 109.
82. See 395 U.S. at 611 n.31.
83. Id. at 611.
84. Id. at 611 n.31 (citing Pollitt, NLRB Re-Run Elections: A Study, 41 N.C.L. Rv.
209 (1963)).
85. Id. (citing Pollit, supra note 84). In these cases, the union won 75% of the rerun
elections.
86. See Getman & Goldberg, supra note 78, at 693.
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ployee free choice87 or when there were promises to correct the
grievances that had led to the interest in unionization.8
1. Violations of Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3).-The con-
stellation of unfair labor practices that usually leads to d bar-
gaining order includes violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of
the National Labor Relations Act. Typical section 8(a)(1) viola-
tions are coercive interrogation of employees about union activ-
ity; surveillance or the appearance of surveillance of union meet-
ings or activity; promises of increased benefits if employees
abandon the union; and threats of economic reprisals, discharge,
or plant closure. The violations of section 8(a)(3) usually include
dismissals for prounion activity. These violations and the actual
use of force or physical violence are "the hallmarks in cases
where bargaining orders issue."'89
Although bargaining orders are sometimes enforced in the
absence of any violations of section 8(a)(3), the case for enforce-
ment is stronger when these violations are present. Violations of
only section 8(a)(1) frequently fail to provide an adequate show-
ing of the need for a bargaining order 0 because generally,
"§ 8(a)(1) violations are less serious and have less residual im-
pact than other unfair labor practices such as § 8(a)(3) violations
. . "91 Discriminatory discharges in violation of section 8(a)(3)
have been described as the employer's "ultimate weapon in
thwarting employees' exercise of § 7 rights"92 and the "surest
87. Id. at 688 (citing G.T.E. Automatic Elec., Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 902 (1972)).
88. Getman & Goldberg, supra note 78, at 689 (citing International Harvester Co.,
179 N.L.R.B. 753 (1969)). "There are few unfair labor practices so effective in cooling
employees' enthusiasm for a union than the prompt remedy of the grievances which
prompted the employees' union interest." 179 N.L.R.B. at 753-54.
89. NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 602 F.2d 1100, 1104 (2d Cir. 1979).
90. See NLRB v. Appletree Chevrolet, Inc., 608 F.2d 988, 998 (4th Cir. 1979)(solici-
tation of grievances by psychologist employed by employer, announcement of improved
benefits, and threatening interrogations of employees were "simple 8(a)(1) violations
[which] do not provide an adequate showing for a bargaining order in the absence of any
credible findings" that the misconduct might recur or that a fair election could not be
held); NLRB v. Lloyd Wood Coal Co., 585 F.2d 752, 757 (5th Cir. 1978)(interrogations,
effort to create impression of surveillance, threats to close mine, and actual shutdown
not shown to be for discriminatory motives were not "so serious and extensive as to
support a Gissel-type order").
91. First Lakewood Assocs. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 416, 424 n.5 (7th Cir. 1978). In
describing § 8(a)(3) violations, this circuit had previously commented that "[n]o conduct
more drastic, or more likely to have lingering, ineradicable effects can be imagined."
NLRB v. Townhouse T.V. & Appliances, Inc., 531 F.2d 826, 830 (7th Cir. 1976).
92. Ludwig Fish & Produce, Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 1086, 1087 (1975).
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method of undermining a union's majority or impeding an elec-
tion process. ' 3
Actual plant closure or discharge of the work force are viola-
tions most often remedied by a bargaining order because by "de-
stroying the bargaining unit, the unfair labor practices have
made a fair election, or any election at all, impossible. ' e4 The
closing of a plant is "the penultimate threat for an employee,
and its psychological effect is at least as likely not to dissipate as
other unfair labor practices we have held to justify" a bargaining
order under Gissel.9
5
The Supreme Court in Gissele8 affirmed the First Circuit's
enforcement of the bargaining order in Sinclair.9 7 In Sinclair,
the only unfair labor practice was the threat of plant closure. A
recent Board decisions focused on the unfair practices that it
considered to have a serious impact-the discharge of employees
and the threat of plant closure. "Because such a threat suggests
possible loss of livelihood, a long-term coercive influence is again
inevitable."99
These assumptions regarding the impact of section 8(a)(3)
violations have been disputed by some commentators, however.
Professor Bok has stated that the discharge of union sympathiz-
ers "can often frustrate a union drive," but "any experienced or-
ganizer knows that a discriminatory discharge may rally the vot-
ers against the employer instead of frightening them into
submission." 1 "0 The study by Getman, Goldberg, and Herman
found that although union supporters viewed these discharges as
93. NLRB v. Sitton Tank Co., 467 F.2d 1371, 1372 (8th Cir. 1972). See Florshein
Shoe Store Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1240 (2d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Coast Delivery Serv.,
Inc., 437 F.2d 264 (9th Cir. 1971).
94. Great Chinese Am. Sewing Co. v. NLRB, 578 F.2d 251, 256 (9th Cir. 1978). See
NLRB v. Fort Vancouver Plywood Co., 604 F.2d 596 (9th Cir. 1979).
95. Electrical Prods. Div. of Midland-Ross Corp. v. NLRB, 617 F.2d 977, 987 (3d
Cir. 1980).
96. 395 U.S. at 619-20.
97. NLRB v. Sinclair Co., 397 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1968).
98. Wright Plastic Prods., Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (Jan. 28, 1980).
99. Id. at 3 (citing Kurz-Kasch, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1978)). See Rapid Mfg. Co.,
239 N.L.R.B. 465, 466 (1978)("The Board has consistently viewed outright threats of
plant closure as coercion of a most serious nature when made by an employer as a pen-
alty for unionization."). But see J. GErMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 80, at
130 (authors found that discharge of union supporters did not cause other union sup-
porters to vote against union).
100. Bok, supra note 23, at 41.
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discriminatorily motivated, this view did not result in their vot-
ing against the union." 1 Yet, the Board and the courts continue
to base their decisions on these assumptions.
Threats to close the plant, decrease the number of employ-
ees, shorten the work week, and discharge employees who spoke
about unionization were sufficient to support a bargaining order
in the Ninth Circuit.102 "Even had every employee testified that
the employer's anti-union actions did not influence his vote, we
would have been hesitant to deny enforcement to a Board bar-
gaining order on the record before us."'0 The participation of
senior company officials in the threatening behavior is often de-
terminative when bargaining orders based on threats are en-
forced. 1°0 Depending on the facts of the case, however, the disa-
vowal of threats by important company officials has been found
to mitigate the effects of some serious misconduct sufficiently to
avoid a bargaining order.
0 5
In a case in which the Tenth Circuit found that the unfair
labor practices comprised a first category situation (outrageous
and pervasive), the unfair practices included threats of dismis-
sal, reprisal and business shutdown, an offer of reward to an em-
ployee if the union lost, discharge of five union adherents, intim-
idation and discharge of an employee, persistent interrogation,
and surveillance of employees.10 6 Since the union had had a
"bare majority," however, the bargaining order was also "justi-
fied under the second category of Gissel."'
0 7
101. J. GrMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 80, at 130.
102. See NLRB v. Bell Mfg. Div., Di Giorgio Leisure Prods., Inc., 483 F.2d 150 (9th
Cir. 1973).
103. Id. at 153.
104. See Rapid Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 612 F.2d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (bargaining order
not enforced because threats did not emanate from officials or members of bargaining
team, but from relatives of officials). See Electrical Prods. Div. of Midland-Ross Corp. v.
NLRB, 617 F.2d 977, 987 (3d Cir. 1980).
105. See NLRB v. Chatfield-Anderson Co., 606 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1979). But
see NLRB v. Scholer's, Inc., 466 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1972)(threats not cured by letter,
leaflet, or employer's speech assuring employees that there would be no reprisals).
106. NLRB v. Okla-Inn, 488 F.2d 498, 508 (10th Cir. 1973).
107. Id. To date, the circuit courts have not reviewed a bargaining order that had
been issued by the Board in the absence of a showing that the union had majority status
at one point in time. In United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, Nos. 79-1807, 79-
1883, (3d Cir. Oct. 30, 1980), however, the court remanded to a sharply divided Board to
consider whether the unfair labor practices were sufficiently outrageous and pervasive to
warrant a bargaining order in the absence of a card majority.
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Sheer numbers of unfair laboropractices have been found to
require a bargaining order,108 but among the circuits the cases
again are not consistent. In one case which concerned the inter-
rogation of one employee, the grant of vacation benefits to part-
time employees, and the discharge of three employees who par-
ticipated in the union effort, the Sixth Circuit did not require
the remedy of a bargaining order because the interrogation was
"marginal" and without continuing impact, and the discharged
employees were offered reinstatement. 09 Yet, in the Third Cir-
cuit, the grant of a wage increase and interrogation of one em-
ployee were found "sufficiently coercive" to support a bargaining
order.'10
Interrogations of employees are found in the majority of
cases in which bargaining orders are issued. The assumption is
that, depending on the surrounding circumstances,"' interroga-
tions can be coercive and restrain employees in the exercise of
their section seven rights. This assumption also is disputed by
the Getman, Goldberg, and Herman study, which found that
employees generally are not sensitive to interrogations." 2 "Of
those union voters who believed the employer knew of their
sympathies, a substantial majority had told the employer them-
selves." 1 3 Any determination of the impact of interrogations is
necessarily subjective; many employees, for example, might not
admit to having been intimidated by interrogations because they
might appear cowardly.
2. Violations of Section 8(a)(5).-Although Gissel referred
to the bargaining order as "a remedy for a § 8(a)(5) refusal to
bargain where an employer has committed independent unfair
labor practices which have made the holding of a fair election
unlikely,"'1 4 a violation of section 8(a)(5) is no longer required to
108. See Frito-Lay, Inc. v. NLRB, 585 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., 554 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1977).
109. See NLRB v. East Side Shopper, Inc., 498 F.2d 1334, 1336 (6th Cir. 1974). Cf.
NLRB v. Lloyd Wood Coal Co., 585 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1978)(supervisor's telling mine
employees that mine would close if they signed union cards did not warrant issuance of
Gissel.type order).
110. See NLRB v. Colonial Knitting Corp., 464 F.2d 949, 952 (3d Cir. 1972).
111. See Blue Flash Express, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 591 (1954).
112. See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 80, at 130.
113. Id.
114. 395 U.S. at 610.
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issue a bargaining order.115 An employer does not violate section
8(a)(5) when he refuses to recognize a union that presents evi-
dence of majority status obtained in ways other than by Board
conducted election.116 The Supreme Court has held that "unless
an employer has engaged in an unfair labor practice that impairs
the electoral process, a union . has the burden of taking the
next step in invoking the Board's election procedure. 1 17 The
Board has added that a violation of section 8(a)(5) occurs when
an employer refuses to recognize a union with majority status
and commits unfair labor practices that undermine union major-
ity and prevent a fair election.118 Further, by committing unfair
labor practices, the employer forfeits his right to demand an
election.1 19
B. Other Relevant Considerations
Actual violations of the law are one aspect of Gissel bar-
gaining orders. Also relevant to the determination of whether a
bargaining order should issue is a consideration of the totality of
the circumstances in each case. The weight to be given to these
circumstances reveals, again, the tension between the goals or
purposes of the bargaining order and the policies of labor law
generally.
120
115. See First Lakewood Assocs. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 416, 423 (7th Cir. 1978); Steel-
Fab, Inc., 212 N.L.R.B. 363 (1972).
[I]t distorts our analysis to predicate bargaining orders on 8(a)(5) violations,
and it is desirable for the Board to concentrate solely on a careful examination
of the employer's 8(a)(1) conduct and its impact upon the holding of a fair
election. Henceforth, in these Gissel-type situations, we shall dispense with
finding an 8(a)(5) violation and instead determine only whether or not a bar-
gaining order is necessary to remedy the employer's 8(a)(1)'s.
Id. at 365.
116. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co. v. NLRB, 419 U.S. 301 (1974).
117. Id. at 310.
118. See Trading Port, Inc., 219 N.L.R.B. 298 (1975), cited in NLRB v. Solboro
Knitting Mills, Inc., 572 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1978).
119. NLRB v. Prineville Stud Co., 578 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1978). In Trading Port,
the Board developed the retroactive bargaining order, retroactive to the bargaining de-
mand. "Our main concern in granting bargaining orders has been, and is, to correct and
give redress for an employer's misconduct and to protect the employees from the effects
thereof." 219 N.L.R.B. at 301.
120. For a discussion of the relevance of events that occur subsequently to the un-
fair practices, see Note, "After All Tomorrow Is Another Day". Should Subsequent
Events Affect the Validity of Bargaining Orders?, 31 STAN. L. REv. 505 (1979) (footnote
omitted).
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1. Subsequent Events.-The Board has opposed the con-
sideration of events that occurred subsequent to the commission
of the unfair labor practices that occasioned a proceeding. 21 The
courts of appeals disagree on whether and when to consider sub-
sequent events.
If the purpose of the Gissel bargaining order is to deter un-
fair labor practices, only the unfair labor practices themselves
are relevant. If the purpose is to insure a free and fair election of
a bargaining representative, it is relevant to consider such fac-
tors as the passage of time, employee turnover, changes in man-
agement, and additional employer misconduct.122 Yet, to permit
consideration of subsequent events may give employers "a great
incentive to refuse to recognize a bona fide bargaining demand
in hopes that a delay would terminate the difficulty 23 and
would "allow an employer to benefit from purposefully pro-
tracting litigation as long as possible.
1 24
It has been suggested that the goal of deterrence is "neces-
sary not because of any inherent value in punishing employers,
but because deterring the employer from committing unfair la-
bor practices itself allows the employees to decide whether to
unionize or not."1 25 For this and other practical reasons, 26 the
Board initially should not be required to consider subsequent
events. When a case is remanded to the Board for independent
reasons, however, the Board should consider subsequent events.
Significantly, more time will have elapsed and employee turno-
ver may have increased; deterrence will continue to be served
121. Bandag, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1045 n.1 (1977), enforced, 582 F.2d 765 (5th
Cir. 1978).
122. Subsequent unfair labor practices are always considered by the Board, see, e.g.,
CBS Records Div., 223 N.L.R.B. 709 (1976), with the approval of the courts. See, e.g.,
Chromalloy Mining and Minerals, Alaska Div. v. NLRB, 620 F.2d 1120, 1131 n.8 (5th
Cir. 1980). Subsequent unfair practices "are always relevant because they demonstrate
that the employer is still opposed to unionization." Id. (citing J.P. Stevens & Co. v.
NLRB, 441 F.2d 514, 520 n.11 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971)). See NLRB
v. Drives, Inc., 440 F.2d 354, 367 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 9k2 (1971). See Hed-
strom Co. v. NLRB, Nos. 78-1800, 78-1801 (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 1980).
123. NLRB v. Tri-State Stores, Inc., 477 F.2d 204, 207 (9th Cir. 1972).
124. NLRB v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 550 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1977).
125. Note, supra note 120, at 522.
126. Id. The effects of unfair labor practices are usually more pervasive at the initial
Board hearing. It would be difficult for the Board to weigh objective factors, such as the
turnover of employees, against subjective factors, such as the impact of the unfair prac-
tice. Id. at 523.
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since subsequent events could be considered, if at all, only on
remand.
127
Events that occur during a delay caused by the administra-
tive proceedings are not relevant if the delay is not the fault of
the union or the employees. 28 If the rule were otherwise, "in-
stead of a deterrent, the administrative process would provide a
reward for employer misconduct."1 29
When a delay is "Board-occasioned,"130 subsequent events
sometimes become relevant to the review of a bargaining order.
The thrust and philosophy of the Act is that employees be rep-
resented by a bargaining agent of their choice and in this situa-
tion which fails to reflect the selection of an agent by the em-
ployees sought to be affected, and where the period for
personnel turnover has been extended by Board-occasioned de-
lay, we conclude that it would be contrary to the intent of the
Act to order enforcement. 181
Board-occasioned delay includes the delay caused when a case is
remanded because the Board did not make adequate findings. In
such a case, the Board is generally required on remand to con-
sider all available evidence.13 2 "Gissel does not apply a nunc pro
tunc principle. . . . It requires contemporaneity-a present
view, albeit with an historical perspective. Industrial democracy
should be allowed to work its will if the present conditions are
sufficiently antiseptic for an election.'
3 3
In the Fifth Circuit, the normal time for determining the
appropriateness of the bargaining order is the time at which the
case is before the Board, not the time at which it is before the
court for enforcement.' " The Board must consider events occur-
127. Id. at 524-25. See L'Eggs Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337, 1353 (9th Cir.
1980).
128. See NLRB v. International Van Lines, 473 F.2d 1036, 1037 (9th Cir. 1973).
129. NLRB v. Drives, Inc., 440 F.2d 354, 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 912
(1971).
130. Clark's Gamble Corp. v. NLRB, 422 F.2d 845, 847 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 868 (1970).
131. Id. But see NLRB v. Staub Cleaners, Inc., 418 F.2d 1086 (2d Cir. 1969).
132. NLRB v. American Cable Syss., Inc., 427 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 957 (1970), followed in NLRB v. Gibson Prods. Co., 494 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1974).
See Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, 558 F.2d 1137 (3d Cir. 1977)(remanded because Board did
not consider effect of passage of time).
133. NLRB v. American Cable Syss., 427 F.2d at 449.
134. J.P. Stevens & Co., Gulistan Div. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514, 525 n.16 (5th Cir.
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ring between the election and the administrative law judge's
hearing but need not consider events between the hearing and
the Board's review of the hearing. 13 5 When the Board fails to
make adequate findings, however, the appropriateness of a Gis-
sel bargaining order is to be decided at the time the Board
makes adequate findings and enters a proper order rather than
"as of an earlier time when it made an inadequate and abortive
order."' 3 6 This reasoning suggests that the courts are penalizing
the Board for failing to make the findings, and it is questionable
whether this action has any tendency to effectuate the policies of
the Act.
This rule was adopted by the Fourth Circuit when it recon-
sidered General Steel Products, Inc. v. NLRB.. 7 The court held
that the Board "should receive proof of any material fact occur-
ring up to the date of the new hearing bearing upon a determi-
nation whether or not a fair election could be held."'388 A mate-
rial fact in General Steel was a complete change in the
ownership and management of the company, which indicated
that a fair election might be possible because the new employer
had not committed unfair labor practices. 39 One judge, who dis-
sented, would not have required the Board to receive new proof
because then "employers could hope to commit unfair labor
practices and then frustrate the Board's petition to enforce a
bargaining order by a hasty housecleaning, to the detriment of
both finality of proceedings and the deterrent effect of Gis-
sel."" 0 Another judge would have enforced the order if the evi-
dence was only of employee turnover, rather than the complete
change in ownership." When both the guilty employer and the
employees who were exposed to the unfair labor practices were
1971).
135. Bandag, Inc. v. NLRB, 583 F.2d 765, 771-73 (5th Cir. 1978).
136. Id. at 772 n.9. See Curlee Clothing Co. v. NLRB, 607 F.2d 1213, 1216 n.4 (8th
Cir. 1979)(When "findings of fact are insufficient to support a Gissel bargaining order,
the Board on remand must consider whether conditions permit a fair rerun election.").
137. 445 F.2d 1350 (4th Cir. 1971). This case was before the circuit court following
remand to the Board by the Supreme Court in Gissel.
138. Id. at 1356.
139. Id. See NLRB v. American Cable Syss., Inc., 427 F.2d at 448.
140. 445 F.2d at 1359 (Winter, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1357 (Haynsworth, C.J., concurring)(If employee turnover were relevant,
litigation could involve "extensive factual controversy over the possible relation of em-
ployment terminations to unfair labor practices charged or uncharged.").
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no longer present, an unbiased election was considered possible
and necessary.""
The Board is usually required to consider evidence of em-
ployee turnover if a case is remanded;148 whether it should be
considered at the initial hearing, however, is a separate question.
The Board has historically presumed that new employees sup-
port the union in the same ratio as the employees whom they
replace.1 4' If this presumption prevailed, employee turnover
would be irrelevant. The courts of appeals generally have not
accepted this presumption and, instead, focus on the possibility
of an uncoerced atmosphere for a fair and free election. When
the unfair labor practices are not outrageous, courts apparently
presume that new employees are not influenced by the em-
ployer's past misconduct. 45 Thus, a fair election can be held,
avoiding the imposition of a union on employees who were hired
after the union's organizing campaign and who may not support
or want a union.
In the Sixth Circuit, if employee turnover and delay in the
proceedings are directly caused by the employer's "own willful
and gross violations of the N.L.R.A.," such turnover and delay
are not relevant considerations when the case is first before the
Board because the goal is to remedy violations "by re-establish-
ing as nearly as possible the status quo ante (before the viola-
tions took place)."" 6 Even when violations are of a less perva-
sive type, if the employee turnover is caused by the employer's
acts (discriminatory discharges, for example), the Board need
not consider it on remand.
147
Initially, the Seventh Circuit followed this rule, reasoning
that if "any party should be penalized for the delay, it should be
the employer since his misconduct occasioned the proceed-
142. NLRB v. Cott Corp., 578 F.2d 892 (lst Cir. 1978). "[A] bargaining order not
only is unnecessary, but may even frustrate the policy of allowing employees to pick the
representative of their choice that Gissel was intended to promote." Id. at 895.
143. See notes 130-38 and accompanying text supra.
144. National Cash Register Co., 201 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1042 (1973); Laystrom Mfg.,
Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1482, 1484 (1965).
145. See notes 151-58 and accompanying text infra.
146. G.P.D., Inc. v. NLRB, 430 F.2d 963, 964 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971).
147. NLRB v. Lou De Young's Mkt. Basket, Inc., 430 F.2d 912, 915 (6th Cir.
1970)(limiting the holding in Clark's Gamble to Board-occasioned delay).
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ing.''148 In cases with marginal violations of section 8(a)(1), how-
ever, the court would "place some, though not controlling,
weight on the changed composition of the work force"'4 because
the remedy of a bargaining order would not be clearly
warranted.
150
When substantial employee turnover is not caused by any
impropriety of the company, some circuit courts have held that
the Board should have considered the turnover when the case
was first before it.152 The Eighth Circuit has held employee turn-
over to be relevant at the initial hearing, but not dispositive be-
cause, otherwise, unfair labor practices of employers might not
be deterred.
52
In the Second Circuit, when the violations are not "outra-
geous" or "pervasive," that is, when they fall within the Gissel
second category, turnover is an important consideration because
of the "possibility of inflicting what may be a totally unwanted,
and even largely unknown, union on a new work force."1 53 The
Ninth Circuit adopted this reasoning because the primary objec-
tive of the Act is to guarantee the rights of employees to select a
bargaining representative and "the Board must not routinely
place a premium on deterring employer misconduct" particu-
larly when the conduct is not outrageous." The same policy of
guaranteeing free choice for employees has prevailed in the First
Circuit. 55
Employee turnover not only is relevant in the Third Circuit,
but also may reverse ordinary presumptions. That circuit has
ruled that the Board must consider present conditions and must
"demonstrate that the present employees are so intimidated
148. NLRB v. Kostel Corp., 440 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. 1971). See Self-Reliance
Ukrainian Am. Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Copps Corp.,
458 F.2d 1227 (7th Cir. 1972).
149. NLRB v. Gruber's Super Mkt., Inc., 501 F.2d 697, 705 (7th Cir. 1974).
150. Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1121 (7th Cir. 1973).
151. See NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 602 F.2d 1100, 1104 (2d Cir. 1979). This
case was remanded to the Board with directions to consider employee turnover. The
Board refused to consider this change on remand. As a result, the second petition for
enforcement of the bargaining order was denied. NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 105
L.R.R.M. 2959 (2d Cir. 1980). See NLRB v. Ship Shape Maintenance Co., 474 F.2d 434,
443 (D.C. Cir. 1972); NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 472 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1972).
152. See NLRB v. Dixisteel Bldgs., Inc., 445 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1971).
153. NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 472 F.2d 170, 175 n.5 (2d Cir. 1972).
154. NLRB v. Western Drug, 600 F.2d 1324, 1327 (9th Cir. 1979).
155. NLRB v. Cott Corp., 578 F.2d 892 (1st Cir. 1978).
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that they probably cannot make a knowing and free choice in a
supervised election. ' 156 In a very recent case,157 however, the
same circuit has enforced a bargaining order despite substantial
employee turnover. "'In the last analysis... those who would
resist this remedy in the name of the employees must answer for
the employees whose free choice is currently impaired by the
lack of adequate remedies.' "158
Related to employee turnover is substantial reduction in the
work force. This problem was addressed, with surprising results,
in the Seventh Circuit. A reduction was relevant "not only be-
cause the division of sentiment among the remaining employees
may be different, but also because employees may view the ben-
efits of unionization in a far different light when the economic
plight of their employer has substantially diminished their
ranks."1 59 This would require the Board to determine if econom-
ics-rather than a retaliatory act on the part of the employer,
which would violate the Act-were the cause of the diminished
ranks. This requirement not only ignores any deterrent effect,
but also increases the findings the Board must make.
2. Characteristics of the Bargaining Unit.-The size and
composition of the bargaining unit have been consistently re-
garded as relevant considerations in the initial determination of
the appropriateness of a bargaining order.160 Enforcement was
granted in the Fourth Circuit when threats were communicated
to a substantial percentage of unskilled and unsophisticated em-
ployees in a small unit.161 In the Seventh Circuit an order was
enforced when three of five employees were threatened in a
small city where the misconduct could create uneasiness among
potential as well as actual employees.16 2 In addition, the employ-
ees were found to be "youthful, unsophisticated or superannu-
ated, unskilled,"163 and more susceptible to extraneous influ-
156. NLRB v. Armcor Indus., 98 L.R.R.M. 2441, 2444 (3d Cir. 1978).
157. Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, Nos. 78-1800, 78-1801, (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 1980)(6-3 deci-
sion)(argued en banc).
158. Id. (quoting Bok, supra note 23, at 135).
159. Peerless of America, Inc., v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1121 (7th Cir. 1973).
160. See NLRB v. Scoler's, Inc., 466 F.2d 1289, 1291 n.2 (2d Cir. 1972).
161. See NLRB v. Kane, 435 F.2d 1203 (4th Cir. 1970).
162. NLRB v. Kostel, 440 F.2d 347, 352 (7th Cir. 1971); accord, Self-Reliance
Urkainian Am. Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1972).
163. 440 F.2d at 352. Accord, NLRB v. Copps Corp., 458 F.2d 1227, 1230 n.7 (7th
Cir. 1972).
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ences. The small size of a plant was determinative in the Tenth
Circuit in a case in which the evidence of the violations "might
seem a bit thin" because, in a larger plant, "the effect of an un-
fair labor practice might be spent by the sheer numbers involved
to the end that a re-run election might be in order." 1"
3. Continuing Strength of the Union Drive.-The Su-
preme Court in Gissel held that for a bargaining order to issue
"on a lesser showing of employer misconduct" (second category),
the misconduct must have had the "tendency to undermine ma-
jority strength and impede the election processes."16 5 A showing
of majority status prior to the occurrence of the unfair labor
practices is required,166 but majority status need not exist at the
time of the election.1 67 Thus, a showing of actual loss of majority
status is extremely relevant to any evaluation of a bargaining
order since "[a]bsent any showing that the employer's activities
in some way unlawfully undermined union majority strength,
the bargaining order cannot be sustained." 168s The requirement
of a showing that the unfair practices undermined the union's
majority strength indicates that the courts do not assume that
unfair labor practices always cause the loss of majority status.
Evidence of continuing support for the union organizing
drive is also relevant. Although there may have been conduct
violative of the Act, that misconduct does not automatically re-
quire the conclusion that it tended to undermine majority
strength. "What may reasonably be thought capable of dampen-
164. Ann Lee Sportswear, Inc. v. NLRB, 543 F.2d 739, 744 (10th Cir. 1976). See
Wright Plastic Prods., 247 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (Jan. 28, 1980).
165. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 614.
166. If majority status was obtained subsequent to the misconduct, the misconduct
obviously was not undermining.
167. 395 U.S. at 610. See NLRB v. Dixisteel Bldgs., Inc., 445 F.2d 1260, 1265 (8th
Cir. 1971).
168. Struthers-Dunn, Inc. v. NLRB, 574 F.2d 796, 802 (3d Cir. 1978).
[W]e think the determination by the NLRB that the Union continued its sta-
tus as majority representative up until at least March 25, 1975, due to the
failure of the 16 employees to notify the Union of their withdrawal of authori-
zation, fails to accord proper recognition to the free and voluntary expression
of opinion by the employees. ...
We fail to see how the unfair practices, found to have commenced on
March 25, 1975, could have had a tendency to undermine majority strength
which was, at that time, nonexistent.
Id. at 801.
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ing the exercise of § 7 rights might be far short of what it takes
to change an employee's mind about the need for a union."169
Although support for the union continued after some of the un-
fair labor practices, when the misconduct was egregious, the
Fifth Circuit did not conclude that the election process had not
been impeded.17 0 This is consistent with Gissel: in a first cate-
gory case characterized by "outrageous" misconduct, the major-
ity status of the union need not be established.7 1 The goal of
the bargaining order in first category cases seems to be to deter
outrageous misconduct, but it has been suggested that the as-
sumption might be that but for the misconduct, the union would
have achieved majority strength, and a bargaining order would
serve to effectuate ascertainable employee free choice.
17 2
4. Union Misconduct.-Union misconduct during the or-
ganizing campaign is relevant, and the Board is required to bal-
ance the severity of the misconduct of the union against that of
the employer.173 Bargaining orders have not been enforced in the
Second Circuit when union misconduct has been so serious that
the possibility of fair elections was eliminated.17 4 In contrast,
union violence that was infrequent and perpetrated by a small
number of strikers did not bar the enforcement of a bargaining
order in one Second Circuit case because the employer was
found to be the more guilty party.
75
169. Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1120 (7th Cir. 1973). See
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1973); Arbie Mineral
Feed Co. v. NLRB, 438 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1971).
170. NLRB v. Orlando Paper, Inc., 480 F.2d 1200, 1201 (5th Cir. 1973). The unfair
labor practices included promises of benefits, coercive interrogation concerning union
membership, coercive suggestion that an employee committee be formed, coercive solici-
tation of employees to oppose union activity, instruction to a supervisor to find a pretext
for discharging a union activist, and the conditional hiring of new employees based on
their willingness to oppose the union. Id. at 1201.
171. 395 U.S. at 613.
172. Comments of Thomas R. Haggard, Professor of Law, University of South Caro-
lina School of Law, in Columbia, S.C. (Sept. 12, 1980). See note 24 supra.
173. Laura Modes Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1592, 1596 (1963).
174. See NLRB v. World Carpets, Inc., 463 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1972)(union members
carried baseball bats on the picket line and threatened nonstrikers; union organizer was
charged with criminal assault). United Mineral & Chem. Corp. v. NLRB, 391 F.2d 829
(2d Cir. 1968)(Picketers attacked company owner and caused injuries, incapacitating him
for five months.).
175. Donovan v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 1316 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1053
(1976). A bargaining order was justified because the employer's misconduct was more
serious than the union's and the following factors were present:
19801
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IV. CONCLUSION
There are many serious obstacles to a uniform application
of the remedy of the bargaining order in Gissel-type situations.
A major problem is the conflict over the purpose of the or-
der-whether it is to insure the free choice of a bargaining rep-
resentative (with the focus on the impact of the misconduct on
the election process) or whether it is to deter employer miscon-
duct. Most circuit courts, at this time, focus on insuring free
choice. 178
It is difficult, some say impossible,177 for the Board to deter-
mine the impact of employer misconduct on the behavior of vot-
ers. In attempting to do this, the Board relies on a number of
assumptions. 17 These assumptions have been criticized as un-
founded and as poor bases upon which to regulate conduct in an
election campaign.1 79 Further, the assumptions are not dealt
with in any uniform manner by the courts of appeals, and this
fact provides additional evidence of the tremendous problems
with "impact determinations."
While the bargaining order cannot insure the protection of
free choice for employees (especially in cases in which the order
imposes representation by a union that'lost an election), it is
likely to deter employers "who might, absent the risk of such an
order, engage in wholesale violations of the Act."180 Particularly
in those situations in which a bargaining order issues for viola-
tions of section 8(a)(1), this remedy is the only one that would
noticeably affect the employer. The alternative remedy, a cease
(1) the existence of valid authorization cards from a majority of the employees
in the bargaining unit; (2) a substantially supported finding that a fair election
would be impossible; (3) a clear causal link between the Company's substantial
misconduct and present inability to conduct a free election; (4) the extensive-
ness of the Company's misconduct both before and after the strike which indi-
cated a likelihood that such conduct would continue if an election were held;
and (5) the Union's demonstrated good faith in submitting to the legal process
up to the time that the Company refused to recognize the Union's card
majority.
Id. at 1323.
176. See notes 30-77 and accompanying text supra.
.177. J. GrMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 80; Bok, supra note 23.
178. See notes 90-105, 111-13 pnd accompanying text supra.
179. See J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 80, at 140-46. See gener-
ally Bok, supra note 23; Hedstrom Co. v. NLRB, Nos. 78-1800, 78-1801 (3d Cir. Aug. 6,
1980)(Rosenn, J., dissenting).
180. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, supra note 80, at 154.
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and desist order, is a minimal penalty in contrast to the reme-
dies of the reinstatement and backpay for violations of section
8(a)(3). The bargaining order is likely to decrease litigation if it
issues upon a finding of the misconduct it was meant to deter,
without the detailed impact analysis that the courts have re-
quired.181 It is not likely, however, that this automatic applica-
tion of the remedy could be sustained legally. The Board's
"power to command affirmative action is remedial, not
punitive.)
18 2
The preference for elections to determine the collective bar-
gaining representative could be preserved by limiting the order
to one year, restricting any collective bargaining agreement to
one year,'8" and forbidding any union security clause in a con-
tract as a condition of the bargaining order.
18 4
The issue of bargaining orders reached the Supreme Court
because a conflict existed among the circuit courts. More than a
decade later, the enforcement of bargaining orders is not uni-
form, indicating a need for new standards. The NLRB can begin
by investigating the type and quality of the bargaining that fol-
lows a bargaining order and by considering the frequency with
which decertification elections occur in the years following a bar-
gaining order and the results of those elections.
Finally, the Board must reevaluate its assumptions about
the impact of unfair labor practices on election processes. The
scant data from a few studies contradict the assumptions. The
NLRB, with its records and access to employees participating in
elections, could devise methods of determining the impact of the
misconduct. Questionnaires or interviews could be obtained
shortly after the elections are held and the results certified. It
would be difficult, but not impossible, to study the impact of
misconduct and to assess the value and legitimacy of the bar-
181. Id.
182. Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940). Accord, Local 60, United
Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961).
183. As early as 1971, the Seventh Circuit included in the bargaining order notice a
provision notifying, advising, and informing employees of their independent right to pe-
tition for a new election after one year. See NLRB v. Drives, Inc., 440 F.2d at 367. This
is now routinely included in the notices. Because of employee turnover, this notice might
not be adequate, and it might be more appropriate to provide for an election at some
point in the future, absent further unfair labor practices by the employer.
184. Bok, supra note 23, at 135. "[B]argaining will not necessarily compel the em-
ployees to join the union or pay dues." Id.
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gaining order and the assumptions upon which the order is,
based.
Patricia M. Sabalis
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